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References

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L. C. Paulson. Isabelle: A Generic Theorem Prover. Springer, 1994. LNCS 828.

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L. C. Paulson. Proving properties of security protocols by induction. Cambridge University, Computer Laboratory, Technical Report No. 409, 1996.

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L. C. Paulson. Mechanized proofs of security protocols: Needham-Schroeder with public keys. Cambridge University, Computer Laboratory, Technical Report No. 413, 1997.

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L. C. Paulson. Mechanized proofs for a recursive authentication protocol. Cambridge University, Computer Laboratory, Technical Report No. 418, 1997.

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L. C. Paulson. On Two Formal Analyses of the Yahalom Protocol. Cambridge University, Computer Laboratory, Technical Report No. 432, 1997.