DIMACS and The Princeton Center for Computational Intractability Joint Workshop on Decentralized Mechanism Design, Distributed Computing, and Cryptography

June 3 - June 4, 2010
Nassau Inn, Princeton, NJ

Organizers:

Ittai Abraham, Microsoft

Dino Gerardi, Yale University

Joe Halpern, Cornell University

Workshop Program:

  
Thursday, June 3, 2010

 9:00 -  9:05  Welcome

 9:05 -  9:55  Overview of work on implementing mediators in game theory 
               Francoise Forges

 9:55 - 10:45  Rational Secret Sharing: A Survey
               Jonathan Katz

10:45 - 11:10  break

11:10 - 12:00  Distributed Computing Meets Game Theory
               Joe Halpern

12:00 -  1:30  lunch

 1:30 -  1:55  Approximately optimal mechanism design via differential privacy
               Rann Smorodinsky

 1:55 -  2:20  Approximate Privacy: Foundations and Quantification
               Joan Feigenbaum

 2:20 -  2:45  Perfect Implementation of Arbitrary Mechanisms
               Silvio Micali

 2:45 -  3:20  break

 3:20 -  3:45  Effective Communication in Cheap Talk Games
               Navin Karthik

 3:45 -  4:10  Language Barriers
               Andreas Blume

 4:10 -  4:35  Game Theory with Costly Computation
               Rafael Pass

 4:35 -  5:00

 5:00 -  5:45  rump session: Lucia Penso, Tal Moran, Jing Chen, Edmund
               Wong, Tim van Zandt, Anniket Ket, Marie Laclau

 7:00 - 10:00  workshop dinner

Friday, June 4, 2010

 9:00 -  9:25  Mechanism Design and Communication Networks
               Ludovic Renou

 9:25 -  9:50  Asynchronous Distributed Computing with Adaptive Heuristics
               Aaron Jaggard

 9:50 - 10:25  When is it best to best-reply?
               Michael Schapira

10:25 - 10:50  break

10:50 - 11:15  From communication equilibria to correlated equilibria
               Peter Vid

11:15 - 11:40  Ittai Abraham

11:40 - 12:05  Lorenzo Alvisi

12:05 -  1:30  lunch

 1:30 -  1:55  Detecting Profitable Deviations
               David Rahman

 1:55 -  2:20  Mediated Contracts and Mechanism Design
               Roland Strausz

 2:20 -  2:45  The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade
               Johannes Horner

 2:45 -  3:10  rump session: David Rahman, +++

 3:10 -  3:35  break

 3:35 -  4:10  Sequential Rationality in Cryptographic Protocols
               Alon Rosen

 4:10 -  4:35  Short Non-Interactive Cryptographic Proofs
               Michael Fischer

 4:35 -  5:00  Inefficiency of equilibria in query
               auctions with continuous valuations
               Rudolf Muller

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