Mitigating Exploits of the Current Interdomain Routing Infrastructure
This material is based on collaborative research supported by the NSF Cyber Trust program through grants CNS-0753061 (transferred from CNS-0716511) and CNS-0753492 (transferred from CNS-0716564). (Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.)
Description
This project addresses fundamental flaws in Internet-routing
infrastructure using both theoretical analysis and practical tools.
The results not only improve the security of the current Internet, but
also advance principles of secure routing design useful for
next-generation protocols. The project advocates a different approach
than previous work in this area by formally defining comprehensive
requirements for protocol security, rather than imposing new
technologies to address one or two specific exploits.
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) provides best-effort connectivity
between the component networks of the Internet, a task called
interdomain routing. However, BGP lacks any security mechanism,
allowing accidental router misconfiguration or intentional attacks
that have far-reaching effects on network stability and traffic
flow. Furthermore, simply adding security mechanisms is insufficient
because BGP also lacks the guarantee that specification-compliant
inputs always produce stable routes across the network.
This project addresses these shortcomings through research on various
assumptions that guarantee good routing behavior and on methods to
verify or enforce these assumptions to prevent deviation from that
behavior. We identify and address attacks that have previously been
studied as well as new attacks that have not yet received attention in
the literature. We target incremental-deployment benefits and
computational efficiency as primary desiderata; thus, our solutions
can offer incentives for immediate adoption without system-wide
changes. Through its educational component, our project introduces
students to cross-disciplinary research. This encourages collaboration
in research projects and allows development of coursework integrating
security, networking, and theory for a timely application domain.
People
Senior Personnel
Graduate Student
Undergraduate Students
Collaborators
Bruno Blanchet,
Alex Fabrikant,
Joan Feigenbaum,
Sharon Goldberg,
Shai Halevi,
Jesse Rao,
Andre Scedrov,
Michael Schapira,
Joe-Kai Tsay
Preprints and papers
- Alex Fabrikant, Aaron D. Jaggard, and Michael Schapira, "On the Structure of Weakly Acyclic Games"
- To appear in Theory of Computing Systems (special issue of invited papers from SAGT 2010)
- Preliminary version available as arXiv:1108.2092
- Aaron D. Jaggard, Swara Kopparty, Vijay Ramachandran, and Rebecca N. Wright, "The Design Space of Probing Algorithms for Network-Performance Measurement"
- Joan Feigenbaum, Vijay Ramachandran, and Michael Schapira, "Incentive-Compatible Interdomain Routing"
- Aaron D. Jaggard, Michael Schapira, and Rebecca N. Wright, "Distributed Computing with Adaptive Heuristics"
- Alex Fabrikant, Aaron D. Jaggard, and Michael Schapira, "On the Structure of Weakly Acyclic Games"
- Joan Feigenbaum, Aaron D. Jaggard, and Michael Schapira, "Approximate Privacy: Foundations and Quantification (Extended Abstract)"
- Bruno Blanchet, Aaron D. Jaggard, Jesse Rao, Andre Scedrov, and Joe-Kai Tsay, "Refining Computationally Sound Mechanized Proofs for Kerberos"
- Aaron D. Jaggard, Vijay Ramachandran, and Rebecca N. Wright, "The Impact of Communication Models on Routing-Algorithm Convergence"
- Sharon Goldberg, Shai Halevi, Aaron D. Jaggard, Vijay Ramachandran, and Rebecca N. Wright, "Rationality and Traffic Attraction: Incentives for Honest Path Announcements in BGP"
- Aaron D. Jaggard, Vijay Ramachandran, and Rebecca N. Wright, "Towards a Realistic Model of Incentives in Interdomain Routing: Decoupling Forwarding from Signaling"
- Bruno Blanchet, Aaron D. Jaggard, Andre Scedrov, and Joe-Kai Tsay, "Computationally Sound Mechanized Proofs for Basic and Public-key Kerberos"
Talks
- More is Not Better: The Perils of Multiple Solutions
- Presented at the Colgate University Division of Natural Sciences and Mathematics Colloquium Series, 18 February 2011
- Presented in the DIMACS REU Seminar series, 28 June 2011
- Distributed Computing with Adaptive Heuristics
- Asynchronous Distributed Computing with Adaptive Heuristics
- Towards a unified approach to (in)decision, with implications for divergence of game dynamics
- Refining Computationally Sound Mechanized Proofs for Kerberos
- Rationality and Traffic Attraction: Incentives for Honest Path Announcements in BGP
- Analyzing Kerberos using CryptoVerif
- Towards a Realistic Model of Incentives in Interdomain Routing: Decoupling Forwarding from Signaling
Posters
- Approximate Privacy: Foundations and Quantification
- A more realistic model of incentives for routing (pdf poster)
Wednesday, November 30, 2011 at 21:21