DIMACS Workshop on Computational Issues in Game Theory and Mechanism Design

October 31 - November 2, 2001
DIMACS Center, Rutgers University, Piscataway

Vijay Vazirani, Georgia Tech, vazirani@cc.gatech.edu
Noam Nisan, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel, noam@cs.huji.ac.il
Presented under the auspices of Next Generation Networks Technologies and Applications and Social Science Methods and Information Technology.

Workshop Program:

Wednesday, October 31, 2001

8:45-9:15 Breakfast and Registration 9:15-9:20 Welcome and Greeting: Fred S. Roberts, DIMACS Director 9:20-9:30 Welcome and Greeting: Noam Nisan, Hebrew University Vijay Vazirani, Georgia Tech Session Chair: Vijay Vazirani, Georgia Tech 9:30-10:30 Christos Papadimitriou, University of California - Berkeley Algorithmic Issues in Game Theory 10:30-11:15 Jon Kleinberg Cornell University Fairness Measures in Optimization Tal Rabin, IBM A Cryptographic Solution to a Game Theoretic Problem 11:15-11:45 Break 11:45-12:30 Kamal Jain, Microsoft Research Equitable, Group Strategyproof Cost Allocations via Primal-Dual-Type Algorithms Michael Kearns, Syntek Capital Graphical Models for Game Theory 12:30-2:00 Lunch Session Chair: Joan Feigenbaum, Yale University 2:00-3:00 Scott Shenker, University of California - Berkeley Mechanism Design and the Internet 3:00-4:15 Eric Friedman, Cornell University A Generic Analysis of Selfish Routing Peter Key, Microsoft Research, Cambridge Mixing Streaming and Flow-Controlled Traffic in Networks: Distributed Control Incentives Elias Koutsoupias, UCLA Selfish Resource Allocation 4:15-4:45 Break 4:45-6:00 Rahul Sami, Yale University Approximation and Collusion in Multicast Cost Sharing Eva Tardos, Cornell University How Bad is Selfish Routing? Tim Roughgarden, Cornell University Designing Networks for Selfish Users is Hard 8:00- Rump session - Session Chair: Noam Nisan, Hebrew University All participants are invited to make 5 minute presentations. Please send title and (optional) abstract plus URL to a paper or a presentation to Noam Nisan at Noam@cs.huji.ac.il. Vijay Vazirani, Georgia Tech Strategyproof profit-maximization via fixed point computations (work in progress) Joint work with Aranyak Mehta and Scott Shenker. Tim Roughgarden, Cornell University The Price of Anarchy is Independent of the Network Topology Chris Dellarocas, MIT and NYU Dynamic optimization framework for designing effective online reputation mechanisms Sasa Pekec, The Fuqua School of Business, Duke University Data aggregation in combinatorial auction design Ahuva Mualem, Hebrew University Truthful Approximation Mechanisms for Restricted Combinatorial Auctions Ron Lavi, Hebrew University Competitive Analysis of Incentive Compatible Online Auctions Liad Blumrosen, Hebrew University Auctions with bounded communication Daniel Grosu, University of Texas, San Antonio A Cooperative Load Balancing Game in Distributed Systems Aaron Archer, Cornell University Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents Michael Rothkopf, Rutgers University Designing and Analyzing Auctions: the Devil is in the details (and not just on Halloween) and some scary heresies Arvind Krishnamurty, Yale University Lower Bounds on Multicast Cost Sharing Joan Feigenbaum, Yale University Incentive-compatible Interdomain Routing (Joint work with Christos Papadimitriou, Rahul Sami and Scott Shenker) David M. Pennock, NEC Compact Securities Markets for Minimizing Risk and Maximizing Information Artur Czumaj, New Jersey Institute of Technology Tight Bounds for Worst-Case Equilibria

Thursday, November 1, 2001

8:30-9:00 Breakfast and Registration Session Chair: Michael Rothkopf, Rutgers University 9:00-10:00 Rakesh Vohra, Northwestern University Combinatorial Auctions 10:00-11:15 Daniel Lehmann, Hebrew University Combinatorial Auctions with Decreasing Marginal Utilities David Parkes, Harvard University Minimal Preference Elicitation: An Equilibrium Approach Tuomas Sandholm, Carnegie Mellon University Bidding Agents with Complex Valuation Problems in Autions 11:15-11:45 Break 11:45-1:00 Ion Mandoiu, Georgia Tech XOR Auctions with Buyer Preferences and Seller Priorities Sven de Vries, Munchen Linear Programming and Ascending Auctions Ilya Segal, Stanford University The Communication Complexity of Efficient Discrete Allocations 1:00-2:30 Lunch Session Chair: Chris Dellarocas, MIT and NYU 2:30-3:30 Michael Wellman, University of Michigan Trading Agents 3:30-4:40 Amy Greenwald, Brown University Correlated Q-Learning Bhaskar Dutta, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi Cost Momotonicity, Consistency and Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Games Rudolf Muller, Maastricht University On the Complexity of Auctions 4:40-5:00 Break 5:00-6:30 Panel Discussion: Computer Science and Game Theory Methodological Differences and How to Overcome Them Moderator: Rakesh Vohra, Northwestern University John Nash, Princeton University Andrew Odlyzko, University of Minnesota Christos Papadimitriou, University of California, Berkeley Mark Satterthwaite, Northwestern University Scott Shenker, University of California, Berkeley Micahel Wellman, University of Michigan 7:15- Banquet (at the Holiday Inn in South Plainfield)

Friday, November 2, 2001

8:30-9:00 Breakfast and Registration Session Chair: TBA 9:00-10:00 Mark A. Satterthwaite, Northwestern University Mechanism Design Under Incomplete Information: Uses, Limitations and the Necessity of Computational Approaches 10:00-10:45 Ilan Kremer, Stanford University Divisible Good Auctions - the role of allocation rules Amir Ronen, Stanford University On Approximating Optimal Auctions 10:45-11:15 Break 11:15-12:30 Andrew V. Goldberg, InterTrust STAR Lab Design of Competitive Mechanisms Jason Hartline, Washington University Two Results On Competitive Auctions Anna Karlin, Washington University Open Problems in Competitive Auction Design 12:30-2:00 Lunch Session Chair: TBA 2:00-3:00 Andrew Odlyzko, University of Minnesota Pricing, Behavioral Economics and Mechanism Design 3:00-3:45 Michel Goemans, MIT Cooperative Facility Location Games Jeffrey MacKie-Mason, University of Michigan An Evolutionary Games Analysis of Bidding Strategies in a Scheduling Auction

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Document last modified on October 29, 2001.