
Studying the relationship between individual behavior, public policies, social networks and epidemic processes



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Virginia Tech NDSSL TR-09-074





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


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Models in Mathematical/Computational Epidemiology







Simdemics: High resolution network-based modeling

- 1. Create a synthetic population
 - Sampling Contingency Tables, Assignment Problems
- Derive a social contact network G
 - Assign activities (CART Trees), locations (Gravity models),
 Construction and analysis of large networks
- 3. Create a model of disease transmission
 - Design probabilistic timed finite state automata based on data
- 4. Simulate disease spreads over G
 - Simulation of a diffusion process
- 5. Study effect of interventions: co-evolution of G, behavior, policy and disease progression
 - Markov decision processes (MDP) and n-way games

Eubank, Marathe et al. Nature'04, SODA, Scientific American, DIMACS, Longini et al. PNAS 06, Science 05, Ferguson et al. Nature 05, 06.





Step 1: Synthetic populations


■Who, where, what, when: *People*

- Individuals

- Household structure

 Statistically identical to U.S. Census

Assigned to Home and Activity Locations



Beckman et al. Transportation Science, NISS technical reports, Barrett et al. TRANSIMS technical reports






Step 2: Urban dynamic social contact network

- Demographically match schedules
- Assign appropriate locations by activity and distance
- Determine duration of interaction
- Generate social network



People Vertex:


- age
- household size
- gender
- income ...








Social Contact Networks are not easy to shatter










Realistic Social Contact network differ from "simple" random networks



Portland Network:

- **■**Cliques within same age group (0-19).
- Simple random graph models cannot produce these structures






Step 3. Within Host Disease Models



Disease can be spread from one person to another.

The probability of transmission can depend on:

- type of disease
- duration and type of contact
- person's characteristics
 - age, health state, etc.



Within host model:
Probabilistic timed
transition systems (PTTS)





Step 4: Fast Simulations for Disease Spread


Distinguishing	EpiSims	EpiSimdemics	EpiFast
Features	(Nature'04)	(SC'09)	(ICS' 2009)
Solution Method	Discrete Event	Interaction-Based	Combinatorial
	Simulation	Simulation	+discrete time
Performance 180 days 9M hosts & 40 proc.	~40 hours	2 hours	Few minutes
Co-evolving Social Network	Can work	Works Well	Works <u>only</u> with restricted form
Disease	Edge as well	Edge as well as vertex based (e.g. threshold functions)	Edge based,
transmission	as vertex		independence of
model	based		infecting events





Visualizing the spatio-temporal diffusion

Spatial and Temporal details on spread of disease at this scale and fidelity








Step 5: Study Effects of Interventions

- Specifying a Situation (Scenario)
 - E.g. How to represent cascading failures?
- Kinds of Interventions
 - PI: Vaccines and Anti-viral, Anti-biotic
 - NPI: Social distancing, quarantining
- Specifying an Intervention
 - When, where, whom & how much
- Cost Functions
 - Human suffering averted
 - Time gained (delay of exponential growth)
 - Resource constraints












Interventions: Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP)



- Behaviors and Disease dynamics can be cast as generalized reaction diffusion: Leads to coupled networks
- Co-evolving dynamical systems






New Network Measures and an application to optimal allocation of PI







Vulnerability and Criticality of nodes

- *V*(*i*) = Vulnerability of a node *i* = probability of getting infected, if the disease starts at a random node
- ■Criticality(v): reduction in epidemic size when the node is vaccinated
- ■V(i, t) = Vulnerability of a node i at time t= probability of getting infected during the first t time steps



- Initial conditions
- Transmission probability
- Network structure not a first order property







Blue nodes are highly critical but not very vulnerable





Vaccination based on vulnerability rank order






- Contact graph on Chicago, ~ 8 million people
- Highly vulnerable nodes are also most critical for this network






Computing vulnerability

- Monte-carlo samples: each sample by running EpiFast
- $V_k(i)$: probability node i gets infected in k iterations
- $R(\infty)$: top n nodes in vulnerability order, V(i)
- R(t): top n nodes in temporal vulnerability order V(i,t)











Correlation with static graph measures







Very little information from static graph measures





Correlations with labels





- Total contact time of a node
- □ Similar correlations at different transmission probabilities
- □ Need better models for individual activities and contact duration





An illustrative case study: allocating and distributing A/Vs through public and private stockpile (Marathe et al.)






The problem

Policy Problem: Is there an optimum strategy to partition the scarce AV doses between public stockpile administered through hospitals and private stockpile distributed using a market-mechanism

Measures of Effectiveness: Number of infected, peak infections, cost of recovery, equitable allocation

Additional Scientific Question: How do disease prevalence, individual behavior, network structure, disease dynamics and AV demand co-evolve?







The Setup

- Use Simdemics modeling framework
- All modeling assumptions used in this study are the same as were used for the "MIDAS medkit" study in June 2008
 - Exception 1: Market distribution replaces the pre-assignment of AV kits based on income
 - Exception 2: Self Isolation of households based on prevalence and sick member
 - Exception 3: Disease prevalence used as a mechanism for adaptation
 - Disease model, Reporting, Diagnosis and Distribution Models: Same
- New River Valley population size: 150K
- The total stockpile of AV is 15k (10% of the population size).
- The price of the AV kit can vary between \$50-\$150 (2008 study: 100\$).
- Total household budget for the AV is 1% of the income.
- The private stockpile can be purchased by anyone who can afford it.





Disease Models

Disease Model:

- SEIR model is used.
- Transmissibility (prob. of transmission in every minute of contact between an infectious node and a susceptible node) = 3E-5
- Incubation and infectious period durations are chosen from distributions, mean = 1.9 and 4.1 days respectively.
- A/V Efficacy: Susceptible nodes are 87% less likely to get infected; infectious nodes are 80% less likely to transmit the disease.
- AV treatment and prophylaxis lasts 10 days.





Reporting, Diagonsing and Distribution of Public Stockpile

Reporting and Diagnosis Model:

- 2/3 of the infectious are symptomatic and report to the hospital.
- Remaining 1/3 of the infectious are asymptomatic and 47% less likely to transmit.
- Only 60% of those who report to the hospital get diagnosed.
- Misdiagnosed: not sick but diagnosed as sick; In every 12 nodes diagnosed as sick 2 are not sick.

Distribution

- The hospital stockpile is distributed to only those diagnosed as infected.
- There is no direct cost to the people for using the hospital stockpile.





Behavioral models

- [Isolation based on Prevalence :] Once the prevalence reaches 0.2%, for individuals diagnosed as infected, with compliance rate 40%, the entire household is isolated at home.
- [**Demand based on Prevalence**:] Total AV supply is 15k: allocated between hospitals and market
 - Hospitals: give to diagnosed as infected
 - Market: sells to households according to demand
- Household demand: $D_{t,h} = \frac{B_{t,h}}{P_t} (1 e^{-\beta x_t})$

Increases with disease prevalence (x_t)

Increases with household budget ($B_{t,h}$); decreases with price (P_t)


price is linear in remaining supply


 β reflects risk aversion or prevalence elastic demand to AV.



Suggests an optimal allocation strategy

- Suggests optimal allocation strategy of AVs between public and private stockpile
 - Hospitals (public sector) should be given priority
 - If > threshold, the remaining stockpile be distributed via market.
 - Private stockpile useful for individuals who are infectious but not symptomatic
- Optimal split (40% to hospitals, 60% to the market) recovers the cost of antiviral manufacturing if the unit cost is < \$42.









Importance of behavioral modeling

- Prevalence elastic demand: Delays the epidemic by about a month

 Self Isolation triggered by

 Prevalence and sick member: reduces the peak of the epidemic and reduces the overall demand









Inequitable allocation & role of government

- Market based distribution is inherently inequitable
 - Prevalence elastic demand creates more inequitable distribution (due to price increase)
- Provides a way for evaluating government subsidy or investment
 - More even distribution possible if price is capped or mechanisms are provided for reimbursing
 - The price range determines the investment needed by the government





Antiviral Purchase and Infection by Income Level



A game theoretic view: AV purchase game

- Players: households
- Strategies: {buy antiviral, not to buy}
- Payoff: F (AV cost, expected number of infected household members)
- Information: AV supply (split between hospital and market stockpile) and price, disease prevalence, household budget.

Strategy	Payment	Infection count
buy	\$605.98	0.0769
not to buy	\$0	0.1692






DIDACTIC: HPC Services Based Epidemiological Planning Environment

Analyst can focus on delivering results rather than becoming a computing expert






Simple User Interface to Set up Experiments







Visual Analytics Support







Conclusions

- Start towards an integrated HPC-based policy informatics environment to support computational epidemiology that goes beyond simply agent-based disease modeling
 - Easy to use by SMEs, highly scalable and resolved
 - High performance computing grids & web-based services
 - Deployed and used successfully (e.g. during recent H1N1 response)
 - Flexible, realistic and efficient representation of individual behavior and public policy
- Presented a realistic case study to understand public health and economic consequences of AV allocations via public and market mechanisms
 - suggests a split between public and market-based stockpile that is optimal (in terms of the peak, time to peak and cost)
 - Individual behaviors play a crucial role prevalence elastic demand and isolation is the key.





Summary: 3 take home points

- **Point 1**: Seamless access to powerful computational models for use by subject matter experts (SMEs) is *desirable and possible.*
 - Computing and modeling advances
 - Diversity of interests amongst various stakeholders
 - Yet a desire and need to share information and data during crisis: Social Computing
 - Leads to a qualitative change in the way public policies are supported
- **Point 2**: Models and data sources are increasingly complex and diverse: *Synthetic Information systems* provide a natural and scalable way for model composition and analysis
 - Unified view of models and data
 - Use of context based modeling and reasoning
 - Interactive simulations
- Point 3: In realistic situations, individual behavior, social networks, public policy & disease dynamics co-evolve
 - Representing multiple behavioral models & multiple network (MTML) is now possible: expressive, easy to use and computationally efficient



