DESIGN VERSUS VERIFICATION: IS VERIFICATION THE WRONG APPROACH?
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A lot of work in the Computer Security community has concentrated on designing
tools to FORMALLY VERIFY the security of cryptographic protocols. On
the other hand, in the Cryptographic community research has focused on
DESIGNING PROVABLY SECURE PROTOCOLS, i.e., protocols that are as secure
as the underling cryptographic primitive. With such protocols, if there is a
weakness in the protocol, this can be exploited to break the underlying
cryptographic scheme or assumption.
Both approaches have had their problems. Criticisms on formal verification
Criticisms on provably secure protocols range from:
- -) key distribution protocols claimed secure under BAN logic, have been
- -) BAN logic and its formal verification alternatives do not prove that a
weakness in the protocol implies that the cryptoscheme, on which it is
based, can be broken.
Several researchers in the cryptographic community feel that in the near
future, more effort will be spent on designing secure protocols and less on
formal verifications. Their arguments are:
- -) a lot of time has been waisted on designing useless protocols such as
playing poker over the telephone,
- -) the methods used result in impractical protocols,
- -) many researchers find the methods used confusing.
The method based on Pseudo Random Functions is controversial since it usually
relies on the assumption that a block cipher such as DES behaves as a pseudo
random function. This assumptions is often viewed as being rather dubious. On
the other hand the zero-knowledge based approach is as strong as theoretically
- -) there are two very powerful design tools which make it possible to
achieve provable secure protocols, namely:
- *) Pseudo Random Functions, invented by Goldreich-Goldwasser-Micali.
- *) Zero-Knowledge, invented by Goldwasser-Micali-Rackoff.
- -) although these tools were first introduced in a theoretical context,
(for example originally zero-knowledge was designed to prove Oblivious
Transfer secure), they have now been used to design several practical
The goal of the panel is to debate whether formal verification methods or
provable secure design methods are preferable and what the potential of these
- -) Yvo Desmedt (Univ. of Wisconsin-Milwaukee: moderator),
- -) Mike Burmester (RH, Univ. of London, UK: used zero-knowledge to design
key distribution protocols),
- -) Jonathan Millen (Mitre: to defend the verification approach),
- -) Others to be announced.